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The "New" Substantive Due Process and the
Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon*
Robert G. Dixon, Jr. **
The intrinsic difficulty of the due process concept, old or
new, is exceeded only by the difficulty of saying something new
about it. One can catalog the decisions and try to hypothesize a
general theory,l or expatiate at great length on the inconsistent
or subject the
but seminal opinions in Griswold v. Conne~ticut,~
more recent series of contraception3 or abortion4decisions to microcosmic analysis. The grundnorms, however, are not easily
found. Just as the equality concept "[olnce loosed . . . is not
~ due process concept resists simple descripeasily ~ a b i n e d , "the
tion and definition.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that the "due
process-fundamental rights" spirit of judicial review, although
not grounded on any intent of the framers of the Constitution to
incorporate natural law, is pervasive and has broader impact in
judicial review than is commonly realized.
The attraction of the due process concept is that its vague,
open-ended, developmental quality qualifies it as a basis for
* This paper was delivered November 7, 1975 a t the Centennial Lectures on Constitutional Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. It is printed without
substantial change, except for the addition of footnotes.
** Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University; Former Assistant
Attorney General In Charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of
Justice 1973-1974.
1. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ.L. REV.
479 (1973). Goodpaster classifies due process a n d equal protection as "fundamental
rights." Id. a t 511. But the due process and equal protection clauses are vague. Are not
the real questions these: what particular "fundamental rights" are chosen by the Court
for protection under these vague clauses, and what are the criteria for choice?
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See, e.g., Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH.L. REV.
197 (1965) (a collection of the comments of Professors Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Thomas I.
Emerson, Paul G. Kauper, Robert B. McKay, and Arthur E. Sutherland); Beaney, The
Griswold Case and the Expanding Right of Privacy, 1966 WIS. L. REV.979; Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NOTHE
DAMELAW.680 (1967).
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV.L. REV.91 (1966).
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broad judicial discretion in protecting society against the procedural or substantive excesses of the political branches.VI'he
courts "find" and apply higher law principles to promote a free,
fair, and just society. The due process concept allows a court to
take care of the textually unprovided-for case of unconstitutionality, to go beyond the "relatively" precise and therefore limited nature of the constitutional clauses dealing with free speech,
freedom of religion, impairment of the obligation of contracts and
the like.
The due process concept is far broader than even the elastic
commerce clause. There is an intrinsic logic or limitation in the
"affecting commerce" doctrine as a base for national power over
intrastate activities-even if some parts of Justice Clark's opinion
in the public accomodations case, Katzenbach u. McClung,' attenuate the nexus principle almost to the breaking point. Can it
be denied that the cumulative effect of denying public accommodations to blacks will adversely "affect" the flexibility of the
national employment market and even decisions concerning
plant location and employee transfer? Accordingly, once one perceives "commerce" as based on the Founding Fathers' concern for
the creation and maintenance of a "national economy," plausibility is restored. Commerce clause cases, however, whether or not
rightly decided, do not involve supposedly immutable principles
as do due process cases?
One attraction of the due process concept to challengers of
governmental action-whether in the cause of preserving laissezfaire in economic mattersg or personal freedom and privacy in
birth control and ab~rtion~~-lies
in its vagueness; normally challengers can a t least get a hearing." But this vagueness extends to
6. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905).
7. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
8. Most of what Congress has attempted to do in recent civil rights legislation is
clearly within the permissible reach of the states' police power. See Levitt & Sons v.
Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960); Reference, Housing, 8
RACEREL.L. REP.769 (1963). The constitutional issue in congressional statute cases like
Katzenbach centers on the source of the regulation, not its intrinsic justice.
9. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897).
10. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. Of course, there is still a need to have a t least a colorable claim of federal right
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what a court is empowered to do with a claim once it has been
allowed to enter the courthouse door. The breadth of this judicial
discretion poses the serious question of the proper role, if any, for
textually undefined higher law in a democratic society. Also
raised are problems of proof and of determining what proof is
relevant? Ultimately we reach the hackneyed, but still meaningwe
ful, phrase "judicial restraint versus judicial acti~ism,"~%nd
occasionally question the "wisdom" espoused by a protected and
protective judiciary that purports both to find the real national
consensus and to hold us all to the standards of the American
dream.
Thus perceived, the due process concept, perhaps more
starkly so in its "new" dress, forces us to deal again with the
"higher law" background of American constitutional law and to
ask the awkward question: Should the judiciary always have the
last word, limited only by a sense of self-restraint that flows from
federalism,14from the political question doctrine,I%r, as Justice
Jackson put it, simply from a "circumspect sense" of what is fit
for judicial treatment and what is not?I6
In the present era, any discussion of the "new" substantive
due process invites reconsideration of at least the following: the
"fundamental right" concept; the role of due process in spawning
new rights such as the right to travelt7and to privacy in various
zones; the irrebutable presumption doctrine as a new basis for
invalidating legislative prescriptions; the overlap of the "new"
substantive due process with the "new" equal protection; and the
adequacy of judicial procedures for eliciting the full range of relevant facts and values. Certainly this list is not exhaustive; other
to get across the judicial threshhold. For a discussion of Justice Harlan's point in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), that under any reasonable past construction of Supreme
Court cases, the Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable to apportionment see R. DIXON,
IN LAWA N D POLITICS
121 (1968)
DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION-REAPPORTIONMENT
[hereinafter cited as DIXON].
12. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flou)
of Information to the Justices, A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV.1187 (1975).
THELEAST
DANGEROUS
BRANCH
118 (1962).
13. A. BICKEL,
14. The "new federalism" concept is evidenced by the Supreme Court's reluctance
to interfere with the enforcement of state laws in state courts. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82 (1971). Compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), with Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALEL.J. 517 (1966). See also DIXON,
supra note 11, at 99-118.
16. Public Service Comm'n v. Wyckoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952).
17. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
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questions abound. For example, are the courts fairly close to
Lochner-typelRintrusions into the legislative sphere in such disparate areas as reapportionment litigation and "section 1983"19
challenges to whole systems of state institution administration?

In approaching a topic as abstruse and limitless as due process, a recourse to historical beginnings and seemingly simple
first principles can be instructive. Due process review of statutes
and executive acts puts in the sharpest focus possible the endless
tango between judicial activism and judicial restraint. At a more
basic level, it invites reconsideration of the legitimizing theories
for the American practice of judicial review, particularly the notion of natural law. This last point is significant inasmuch as
natural law or natural justice was invoked to justify judicial vigor
in constitutional litigation or to add meaning to due process as
and as recently as Duncan u. L~uisiana.~'
early as Calder u.
Further, the notion of natural law has been relied on to explain
our constitutional beginnings and to justify judicial review itself.

A. Lack o f Support for Judicial Review i n Contemporaneous
Natural Law Theory
It is axiomatic t h a t a major element in the justificatory
theory for the American Revolution was derived from John
Locke's theory of the social contractz2and its derivative principle
of a right to cast off rulers faithless to the terms of the supposed
agreement. As Professor Edward S. Corwin has pointed out, the.
written Constitution can be viewed as a tangible embodiment of
a new agreement.23In this manner, the social contract concept is
brought down from the rarified stratosphere of natural lawnatural rights theorizihg and made concrete.
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
20. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In Calder, Justice Chase proclaimed that "[aln Act
of the Legislature (for I cannot call it law) contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." Id. a t 388.
Justice Iredell, concurring, remonstrated that, "the ideas of natural justice are regulated
by no fixed standard." Id. at 399.
21. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
ESSAYSBY
22. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, in SOCIALCONTRACT:
LOCKE,HUME,AND ROUSSEAU
69 (Oxford U. Press 1948) [hereinafter cited as Second
Treatise].
23. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 1,
2), 42 HAW.L. REV.149, 365 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Corwin].
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It is less easy, however, to move from the Lockean natural
law-natural rights foundation for both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of 1789 to a justification in similar
terms for broad-gauged judicial review of governmental action
under the "people's pact." Lockean natural law is not an elitist
concept. Indeed, natural law generally, despite its esoteric qualhas not been an elitist concept except when intertwined with
theology and a hierarchical church.25It was, for example, a tenet
of Cicero that natural law requires no interpreter other than the
individual himself.26
Similarly, Lockean natural law is set forth as a set of selfevident propositions prescribing how, to any reasonable man, the
basic components of the social order must be perceived. The
state, for example, is to enforce the natural right to private property that arises when man mixes his labor with the free goods of
nature,27but Locke does not contemplate an enforcement or review mechanism divorced from popular control. He does not deal
with the problem of better or worse social policies, the harmonization of wills, or the achievement of a just and virtuous society-unless it be implicit that a properly structured system will
yield these fruits a u t o m a t i ~ a l l yAlthough
.~~
in Locke, as in other
natural law theorists, there are high-sounding generalizations on
liberty and equrlity, the primary stress is on the legislative power
as the supreme power in the commonwealth. To be sure, natural
law commands that the legislative power design laws only for
"the good of the people."29The absence of formal review devices,
24. "As a matter of fact all theories of natural law have a singular vagueness which
is both an advantage and disadvantage in the application of the theories." Preface to C.
HAINES,
THEREVIVAL
OF NATURAL
LAWCONCEPTS
a t uii (1930).
25. On the "re-secularization of natural law" in the work of Grotius see G. SABINE,
A
OF POLITICAL
THEORY
420 (rev. ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as SABINE].
HISTORY
26. Corwin, supra note 23, a t 161.
27. Second Treatise, supra note 22, §§ 27, 138.
28. Indeed, one writer has suggested that if Locke's social theory contemplates a
contract between a ruler and the people, it is a static concept. If the right of revolution
depends on the violation of a contract, the people are never entitled to begin a revolt unless
the rulers have first broken the contract, even though conditions have changed and the
people have changed their ideas of what they want from their government. See A.P.
LAMPRECHT,
THEMORAL
AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY
OF JOHNLOCKE
148 (1962). This observation is warranted, however, only if the basic popular sovereignty thrust in Locke and
the necessary flexibility on policy which flows from a n election system are ignored. For
when Locke speaks of delegating power, it is quite clear that a n emerging Parliamentarism
is what he has in mind, and that no matter how power is delegated, whether to a representative body or to one man, the ultimate end of the law is "the good of the people." Second
Treatise, supra note 22, § 142.
29. Second Treatise, supra note 22, § 142.
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however, implies "a competency of the maj~rity"~"hat cannot
easily be juxtaposed with any idea of an enforceable natural or
civil right. Locke is far clearer in his construct of a theory of
popular sovereignty-as a by-product of a social contract moving
man from a state of nature to an organized society-than he is
regarding the situs of sovereignty inside the c o m m ~ n i t y . ~ ~
In the hands of Blackstone, moreover, this competency of the
Lockean majority "to act and conclude the rest"32 emerges as a
simple prescription for parliamentary supremacy: "So long . . .
as the English Constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm that
the power of Parliament is absolute and without control.":'"
Blackstone states specifically that "there is no court that has
power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in . . .
evident and express words."34 This is legislative supremacy in
pure form, a form that has continued in Great Britain, and is the
theoretical foundation today for Prime Minister Indira Ghandi's
reshaping of Indian law and Indian Supreme Court power
through statutory pro~ess.~"
Realistically viewed, when Locke is reduced to his implicit
majoritarianism-as made explicit for Britain by Blackstone's
paeans to the power of Parliament-Lockean theory affords little
support for judicial review as an operating system denying legislative supremacy when it conflicts with fundamental rights. In the
alternative, can support be derived from the social contract
theory of the great French romantic, Jean Jacques Rousseau, who
asked how man could join a society and keep his freedom too?
Lifted out of context there are many lines in Rousseau more conducive to the concept of a non-elective supreme censor, functioning to save the people from themselves, than anything that can
be found in Locke.
"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in ~hains,"~%ays
Rousseau, surveying societies based on false principles. But under
30. See A. DEGRAZIA,
PUBLIC
AND REPUBLIC
27 (1951).
31. As one distinguished commentator has said, Locke's philosophy has "logical difficulties" and he "regarded the setting u p of government as a much less important event
supra note 25, a t 537, 534.
than the original compact that makes civil society." SABINE,
32. Second Treatise, supra note 22, 9 95.
33. 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
162.
34. Id. a t 91.
35. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1975, 9 E, a t 3, col. 1; Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1975,
4 A, a t 12, col. 1. See also Nanda, T h e Constitutional Framework and the Current Political
CON.L. Q. 859 (1975).
Crisis i n India, 2 HASTINGS
36. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL
CONTRACT:
ESSAYS
BY LOCKE,
HUME,AND
R o u s s ~ ~(Oxford
u
U. Press 1948) (opening line) [hereinafter cited as Rousseau].
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his alternative, most inaptly called a "social c ~ n t r a c t , " ~man
'
could achieve a harmonization of individual desire and social
good. The key to Rousseau's thought is his creation and juggling
of a dual concept of "will" as the basis for the social order and
for man's relation to it:
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend
and protect with the whole common force the person and goods
of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with
all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under
the supreme direction of the general will, and in our corporate
capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the
whole.38

The general will is not the "common will," for that is just the
sum of personal desires. The general will is the purified will of the
community; being the best for the community, it is likewise the
best for each member of the community. Accordingly, the "real
will" of each individual is that the "general will" be achieved; as
a moral being, each individual must "will" the general good (or
"general will" of the community). This is so despite the fact that
baser wills, unless corrected, may get in the way. Is it proper,
then, for the individual to be forced to give up his personal desires
or common will in preference for his real will, which is part of the
general will? Of course, says Rousseau, and hence the paradox
that one can be forced to be free:
In order then that the social compact may not be an empty
formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking . . . that whoever
refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by
the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be
forced to be free . . . . This alone legitimizes civil undertakings,
which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the
most frightful abuses.39

All of this is somewhat heavy going, but nevertheless quite
appealing as a moral concept. Indeed, it is the basis for much
religion, and it has been viewed as a basis for Immanuel Kant's
basic construct :
The universal Law of Right may then be expressed thus: "Act
externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy Will
37. SABINE,
supra note 25, at 587.
38. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 179-80.
39. Id. at 205-06.
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may be able to co-exist with the Freedom of all others, according
to a universal Law."40

"Kant's categorical imperative," says G.D.H. Cole, "is Rousseau's General Will restated in terms of personal ethical behavior. "41
If Rousseau's "forced to be free" concept could be translated
into governmental terms, it would be moral but intrinsically undemocratic, for it would vest power in a supreme censor (read,
"Supreme Court") to "correct" the imperfect "wills" of the members of the body politic, as expressed in legislation, and make
them follow their "real will." Such a translation was made in the
involuted thought of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hege1,42but not by
Rousseau, a thinker more gifted for suggesting parodox than for
prescribing governmental form. For Rousseau, native of Geneva,
the direct democracy of the city-state was the ideal form-a logical derivative of his notion that the "general will" could be
achieved by a cancelling-out process but could not be "repre~ e n t e d . "Thus,
~ ~ even a t the conceptual level, his basic ideas are
not relevant to a large state with multiple, overlapping interest
clusters.
Essentially, Rousseau's "general will" is small group altruism. There is no mechanism for identifying it and authoritatively
enforcing it. Without a t least a shadow of enforceable elitism, we
have no basis in Rousseau for even a conceptual link to judicial
review, let alone a link to a judiciary constitutionally empowered
to determine and enforce the "general will," institutionalized as
substantive due process, against governmental action.
Therefore, although a t first glance the seed might seem to be
there, the idea of a nonpopular body empowered to create and
impose the grundnorms for a society-whether called natural law,
natural rights, or general will-is not part of Locke or earlier
40. I. KANT,THEPHILOSOPHY
OF LAW(1796), quoted in M. SPAHR,
READINGS
IN RECENT
POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY
181 (1948).
IN SOCIAL
THEORY
126 (1950).
41. G.D.H. COLE,ESSAYS
42. Hegel states that:
The state, which is the realized substantive will, having its reality in the particular self-consciousness raised to the plane of the universal, is absolutely rational. This substantive unity is its own motive and absolute end. In this end
freedom attains its highest right. This end has the highest right over the individual whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the state.
OF RIGHT4 258 (1821), quoted in M. SPAHR,
READINGS
IN
G.W.F. HEGEL,THEPHILOSOPHY
RECENT
POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY
189 (1948).
IN SOCIAL
THEORY
130 (1950); SABINE,
supra note 25, at 59243. G.D.H. COLE,ESSAYS
93.
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natural law theorists, not part of Rousseau, not part of English
development.

B. Judicial Review as a "Practical Postulate"
In view of the influence of both Locke and Blackstone in the
American colonies, how, Professor Corwin asks, did the United
States avoid the translation of popular sovereignty into legislative
supremacy? He offers t~o~explanations:
In the first place, in the American written Constitution, higher
law a t last attained a form which made possible the attribution
to it of an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute
emanating from the sovereign people. Once the binding force of
higher law was transferred to this new basis, the notion of the
sovereignty of the ordinary legislative organ disappeared automatically, since that cannot be a sovereign law-making body
which is subordinate to another law-making body. But in the
second place, even statutory form could hardly have saved the
higher law as a recourse for individuals had it not been backed
up by judicial review. Invested with statutory form and implemented by judicial review, higher law, as with renewed youth,
entered upon one of the great periods of its history, and juristically the most fruitful one since the days of Justinian.j4

This quotation has a deceptive simplicity, particularly in its
almost casual inclusion of judicial review as a natural, necessary,
and functional derivative of a written Con~titution.~Worwin
does
not explain judicial review, he assumes it. An addition to Corwin's italicization will help bring out the unresolved tensions in
his construction. Let us stress the idea of a "new sort of validity"
for higher law, which he proceeds to denote as the "validity of a
statute emanating from the sovereign people."
One immediate problem is that ordinary laws are statutes
too, and have a more recent emanation from the people than
ancient constitutional texts. Laying that aside, the Corwin construction, in its first element, firmly identifies "higher law" for
American constitutional purposes not with the "embodiment of
essential and unchanging justice,"46 (which is the common strand
44. Corwin, supra note 23, a t 409 (emphasis in original).
45. T o be sure, Corwin was only purporting to give a factual explanation, based on
actual institutional development, to the question he posed. Nevertheless, as the peroration
of almost 100 pages of natural law analysis from the Greeks forward, it implicitly has a
normative quality.
46. Ironically, this phrase is taken from the late Clinton Rossiter's Introduction to
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of natural law theorizing) but with the "will" of a particular
people at a particular time as made manifest in written form.
Finally, Corwin says, "higher law" could not have been "saved"
as a "recourse for individuals" against government without judicial review as a safeguard against legislative sovereignty.
Chief Justice Marshall too, to be blunt about it, saw judicial
review as a virtually self-evident derivative of a written constitut i ~ n Since
. ~ ~the time of Marshall we have come to perceive that
this self-evident quality of judicial review predicated on a written
constitution, and hence the justification for an acceptance of judicial review itself, is dependent on certain variables: (1)the issue
before the court; (2) the breadth of discretion which the relevant
constitutional text confers upon the court; (3) the breadth of
discretion actually asserted by the court in reaching a decision;
and (4) the plausibility with which the court can link that discretion to a constitutional text or a reasonable inference therefrom.
For Marshall in Marbury v. M a d i s ~ nthe
, ~ ~question of judicial review was greatly simplified by the nature of the case. Once
Marshall had determined to interpret the mandamus statute as
a congressional enlargement of the constitutionally defined original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, a conflict arose between
the statute and article I11 of the Constitution. The Constitution
is starkly clear; in limiting the Court's original jurisdiction to two
categories, neither of which fitted Mr. Marbury. Further, the
legislature was tampering with the Court's own status in the sepa
clearly created by the first
aration of powers ~ y s t e m ~ ~ -system
three articles of the Constitution. The exercise of judicial review
in Marbury, therefore, can be viewed as simply a defensive act
by the Court to preserve its constitutional status. No act of the
the 1955 reprinting of the Corwin essay. Rossiter, Prefactory Note to E. CORWIN,
THE
"HIGHERLAW"BACKGROUND
OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAWa t vii (1955).
47. Marshall justified judicial review in this manner:
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining
that courts must close their eyes on the constitution and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. . . .
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions-a written constitution-would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much
reverence, for rejecting the construction.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
48. Id.
49. See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1, 35-36.
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popular will creating a substantive public policy was blocked by
the review. The Court simply vindicated the distribution of power
contemplated by the written Constitution. There was no need to
even consider invoking broad principles of natural justice which
had come down through the ages and been embedded, arguably,
in a constitutional phrase such as "due process."
In short, the Supreme Court in Marbury can hardly be said
to have undertaken to create new "higher law" with new substantive content. Yet, when the Court does do just that, when it
creates new "higher law" not linked to the Constitution by inferences historically or logically supportable, is the end product still
"higher law?" What happens to Corwin's explanation of the
"higher law" nature of American constitutional law when the
"higher law"-initially viewed as a "statute emanating from the
sovereign peoplev-becomes court-made "unwritten law" and
emanates from temporal and shifting Supreme Court majorities?
We come thus to a paradox. We justify the Constitution, and
judicial review of it, on a basis which, if questionable a t the outset
from the standpoint both of natural law theory and of actual
, ~ ~become wholly unreal today. The Conpopular s ~ v e r e i g n t yhas
stitution may be amended in respect to some formal matters such
as vice-presidential vacancies, but not in respect to any of the
policy issues which provide the heat and fervor in judicial review." The popular feeling can express itself through the legislature, and to an extent through the President, but not through the
Court. Yet, through recently developed concepts of the "new
equal protection" and the "new substantive due process," the
Court may have power to "amend" the whole system and control
the basic norms of politics and life.

From its modest beginnings in 1803, the practice of judicial
review has come to be a pervasive, even dominating aspect of the
50. See C. BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED
STATES
(1935). Beard questions the existence of any popular support for the Constitution
at the time of its ratification. He contends that the Founding Fathers in Philadelphia had,
with few exceptions, personal economic interest in the outcome of the constitutional text.
Furthermore, no popular vote ratified the document, and the only popular expression was
the vote for delegates to the ratifying conventions. Even then, only one-fourth of the
persons eligible to vote did so. Id. at 325. For a critique of the Beard analysis see R.
BROWN,
CHARLES
BEARD
AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1956).
51. See Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of our Living Constitution, 66 MICH.
L. REV.931 (1968).
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governmental scene, commanding tremendous respect. Although
courts may become whipping boys for particular decisions, the
practice of judicial review is a closely held "Linus blanket." At
the same time, it must be noted that very large areas of review,
like the Marbury v. Madison case itself, either can be explained
as part of the operating necessities of our system or for other
reasons as not involving the kind of open-ended judicial discretion characterized by substantive due process-fundamental rights
review. Such areas do not involve the importation of natural law
theory into the constitutional system.

A.

'Ynstitutional Review"

When one reflects on it, a surprisingly large portion of judicial review is devoted, as was Marbury, to policing or adjusting
the various institutional arrangements and power-allocating rules
in our constitutional system. By definition, this invites
document-related review, not natural justice review. Major components include the following: (1)separation of powers issues; (2)
intra-branch structure and office-holding issues; (3) federalism
issues; and (4) commerce-clause-related issues. In broadest
perspective, the headings can be collapsed into the two broad
constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism;
intra-branch provisions overlap with the former, and the commerce clause is a derivative of the latter. Apart from the question
of popular sovereignty itself, it is no concern of natural law or
fundamental justice how power is distributed among the various
organs constituting the national government, or whether power is
divided vertically between nation and states. Indeed, Britain and
France, from which the western world has derived so much political learning, have neither separation of powers nor federalism;
the United States has both.
1. Federalism

Federalism produces a broad range of cases turning not on
fundamental rights, but on differing theories of how the Founding
Fathers intended to strike the balance between matters committed to the nationwide political power of the central government
and matters reserved to t.he "parochial" political power of the
stated2
52. For a discussion of whether the sub-national nature of the local legislature and
the corresponding disuniformity in policies raise special problems of "fundamental jus-
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The most fruitful source of litigation emanating from federalism has been the never-ending sequence of cases dating from the
steamboat monopoly case in 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden." In this
sequence, the commerce clause, which allocates power over foreign or interstate commerce to the Congress, is invoked against
state regulatory or tax legislation. The cases pose disputes over
the situs of power in our system, not over the impingement of
governmental power on fundamental rights. In respect to state
regulatory or tax legislation impinging on interstate commerce
values, the concept of federal supremacy creates a necessity for
judicial action. A court is put in the middle with little constitutional guidance on the question of "how much" of a burden on
commerce is "too much."54 The process may degenerate almost
to arbitration rather than adjudication under agreed principles?
Nor are there any universal principles of right for the courts
to grapple with when the federal and state governments themselves "come to blows." The federal government may allege that
acts of the states threaten to undermine it or its instrumentalities, as exemplified by the case involving attempted state taxation of the national bank56and the more recent cases on state
taxation of federal government contractors." Conversely, the
states may allege that federal acts threaten to undermine them?
None of these disputes, no matter how basic to the federal
structure, require resort to principles of fundamental law for their
resolution. Because federalism and the interstate commerce contice" justifying extraordinary judicial intervention through amorphous "substantive due
process" concepts see notes 155-56 and accompanying text infra.
53. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
AND VARIETIES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL
54. Freund, Forward to T. POWELL,VAGARIES
(1956).
INTERPRETATION
55. See F. RIBBLE,STATEAND NATIONAL
POWEROVERCOMMERCE
(1937).
56. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); accord, First Agricultural
Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
57. E.g., Rohr Aircraft Co. v. San Diego County, 362 U.S. 628 (1969); City of Detroit
v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110
(1954); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
58. A case upsetting to the concept of state autonomy within the state's own sphere
is Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In that case, it was held that federal labor
standards extend to state-operated schools and hospitals. We have not heard the last of
this issue, as a case on the Supreme Court's 1975 term docket raises the question whether
further extension of federal wage standards t o city and state employees, including firemen
and policemen, is a valid exercise of the commerce power. National League of Cities v.
Dunlop, Civil No. 74-1812 (D.D.C., Dec. 31, 1974), prob. juris. noted, 420 U.S. 906 (1975)
(No. 74-878) (argued March 2, 1976 sub n o n . National League of Cities v. Usery).
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cept are themselves optional constitutional principles, litigation
under them does not reach the level of natural justice review.
2. Separation of Powers

Traditionally less productive of litigation than federalism,
the separation of powers principle, in part because of the troubles
of the Nixon Presidency, has begun to receive persistent, indeed,
insistent attention.59Because executive branch-legislative branch
disputes at the highest level have commonly been left to the
processes of cajolery, persuasion, bluff, and political tradeoffs, it
was not until 1974 that the principle that the President is subject
to a direct suit while in office was established. At stake in United
States v. Nixon' was a matter of the highest importance: the
existence and range of executive confidentiality when the information sought to be protected was deemed relevant to a criminal
proceeding. On the outcome hinged, in part, the continuance in
office of a President. In resolving the dispute, the Court rejected
the immunity doctrine, and although it gave executive privilege
clear constitutional support, it subordinated it to the need for
evidence in an ongoing criminal proceeding, This was a momentous decision. Nevertheless, was it not one document-related and
supported by principles of compromise derivable from the separation of powers concept rather than one founded on principles of
natural law?61
--

59. A partial list of subjects over which disputes might arise, either related to the
separation of powers principle itself, or to intra-branch structure and personnel issues,
would include a t least the following: executive privilege, Presidential domestic lawmaking powers, Presidential foreign affairs law-making power, Presidential impoundment
of funds, impeachment, indictment of a high officeholder before impeachment, the pardoning power, the pocket veto power, appointment and removal of high Executive officers,
immunities of Congressmen, the internal discipline power of Congress, and the emoluments clause. Although the issues raised in these disputes vary in intensity of public
interest, some concern the foundations of our system.
60. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For discussions of the importance of this case see
Symposium-United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV.4 (1974); Cox, Executive
Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV.1383 (1974).
61. As Chief Justice Burger put it:
[Tlhe separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence. . . . To read the Art. I1 powers of the President as providing an
absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal
statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of a "workable government" and gravely impair the role of the
courts under Art. III.
418 U.S. a t 707.
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The analogue to the Nixon case, with regard to the status and
immunities of members of Congress, is Powell u. M c C o r r n a ~ k . ~ ~
That case raised the question of whether it was within the constitutional power of the House of Representatives to refuse to seat
an elected Representative, not because of noncompliance with
the age, residence, and citizenship requirements of article I, section 2 of the Constitution, but because of conduct deemed detrimental to the proper discharge of legislative duties. On the outcome hinged not only the continuance in office of Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell, but also control of Congress over its internal affairs. Here too, however, when faced with this question of
great import, the Court turned not to principles of natural law for
its resolution but rather t o a simple interpretation of constitutional language .63
Clearly, the separation of powers system was designed, as
Justice Brandeis once put it, "not to promote efficiency" but to
foster a creative and self-checking tension among the branches in
the cause of freedom and balance.64Predictably, this tension produces constitutional disputes over structure and authority of the
largest dimension. The resulting judicial discretion to act is large,
but the claims and their resolutions are inevitably squarely
founded on the document.

B. Interpretation of "Specific" Guarantees of Liberties and
Rights
Apart from disputes under "institutional review,"" where
the Constitution is the conceded source of applicable (although
not "fundamental") principles, a wide range of disputes arise
under such relatively precise constitutional provisions as the contract, bill of attainder, and ex post facto clauses, or under the
various components of the Bill of Rights. Although it risks the
wrath of t h e gods t h a t rule our orthodox constitutional
jurisprudence to raise the question, one might ask whether the
Supreme Court's action under some of these provisions is, on
occasion, more a product of creative leaps and a natural justice
spirit of review than of logical inference from the document or its
purposes. While it must be conceded that much litigation under
these provisions does not leave the courts to roam a t large, seek62.
63.
64.
65.

395 U.S. 486 (1969).

Id. at 548.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Cf. BLACK,
STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW(1969).
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ing new fundamental values,66does the Court, as some insist was
the mark of the Warren Court,67often go in with a clause but
come out with a Delphic pronouncement? Can aspects of the
"new" substantive due process be found here, as well as under the
due process clause? Full answers to these questions lie beyond the
scope of this exploratory article but they cannot be entirely ignored.
In litigation under specific provisions of the Constitution, the
tension is between values already deemed important by virtue of
inclusion in the Constitution and competing current social interests in, for example, safety, stability, or law enforcement. Implicit in the balancing process that occurs is the corollary idea
t h a t the principles appealed to are not absolute." However
strongly some may have felt.concerning the manner in which the
Court struck the balance when the First Amendment was invoked
unsuccessfully to limit the congressional power of inve~tigation,~~
or successfully to bar the government from making it a crime for
a Communist to work in a defense facility,70none could say that
the Court was working independently with a principle unknown
to our constitutional order. The reach of the principle was hotly
disputed, but the principle was there.
A similar observation could be made about obscenity litiga~~
is not free speech
tion, a most depressing ~ p e c t a c l e .Obscenity
66. For example, whatever one may think of the "clear and present danger" doctrine
as a judicial gloss on the First Amendment, it is a conscientious attempt to deal with a
specified constitutional value. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
67. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.L.J.
1 (1971); Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALEL.J. 227 (1972); cf. Ely,
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALEL.J. 920 (1973). Compare
these critics of the Warren Court with Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition,
and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV.L. REV.769 (1971).
68. See Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark, 8 UTAHL. REV.167 (1963). The issue of
whether the First Amendment is an absolute principle is addressed in the MendelsonFrantz debate: Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CALIF.L. REV.821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to
Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF.L. REV.729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amendment and
the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND.L. REV.479 (1964).
69. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957).
70. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965) (three different prosecutions arising out of a mass demonstration in front of a
Baton Rouge jail were overturned on First Amendment grounds).
71. I t is not, however, without its humorous moments. Note, for example, the
Ginzburg rule that "it is all right to give it away, but you can't sell it." Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
Ginzburg was convicted under a federal obscenity statute for using the mails to sell
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we are told;72but answering the implicit question of what is obscenity has operated to turn judges' chambers into "dirty movie
houses" and required the use of a separate locked room for obscenity briefs and related materials in the Supreme Court building. This unsatisfactory state of affairs, unimproved over a
fifteen-year period, has recently led Justice Brennan to abandon
the majority position he had supported and to join the position
of former Justice Douglas and others in according virtual carte
blanche to obscenity under the First Amendment.73Whether this
is forsaking the "low road," as Justice Douglas put it in applauding Justice Brennan's switch, necessarily depends upon one's
point of view. An alternative to ease the burden of the Court in
this field would be to revert to a very strict definition of obscenity,
delegate the matter to local community juries, and then tightly
limit review.74
For our present purpose, the important point is that an expressed constitutional value is a t stake. While a majority of the
three publications: Eros, Liason, a n d The Housewife's Handbook on Selective
Promiscuity. Although it was questionable whether the materials were themselves obscene, the Court held that they were obscene in the context of the manner in which the
publications were sold and their "characteristics as a whole." The Court took into account
the fact that the advertising and editorial formats appealed solely to the prurient interests
of the potential readers. Part of the evidence of "pandering" was the effort of Ginzburg
to secure mailing privileges from post offices a t Intercourse, Pa. and Blue Ball, Pa. in order
to have the post mark on the publications. In short, the "leer of the sensualist" permeated
the advertising.
72. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Justice Brennan expressed the then
current view of the Supreme Court in these words:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties [sic], unless excludable because
they encroach upon a limited area of more important interests. But implicit in
the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance . . . . We hold that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.
Id. a t 484-85.
73. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 113 (1973) (Brennan, Stewart, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Brennan, the author of the majority opinions in Roth
and Ginzburg, made a complete turnabout in Slaton. He noted that the Court's experience
after Roth almost required abandonment of the effort to determine which materials are
obscene and that therefore the Court should reconsider the Roth postulate that there
exists a class of "sexually oriented expression" that may be suppressed. But even assuming the existence of that class of materials, Brennan concluded that "the concept of
'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity . . . to prevent substantial erosion
of protected speech as a by-product of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and
to avoid costly institutional harms." Id. a t 103.
74. This is the apparent goal of the current Court majority as expressed in Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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Supreme Court is still reluctant to give a free reign to obscenity,
too broad a repressive policy would reach a fair amount of legitimate literature and art. Wherever the balance is struck, the specific constitutional guarantee of free speech provides the
legitimizing basis for the Court's pronouncement.
In principle it can be suggested that there is less need in the
area of "specific" freedoms and rights than in institutional review
for the Court to push beyond the bounds of reasonable inferences
from the document. Commerce litigation concerning, for example, state taxes on interstate business puts the Court in the middle. It must reach a decision even if the competing claims are
equally balanced and there is no clear "law." In respect to "specific" guarantees of rights, however, there is less necessity to act
in every case. It is up to the challenger to make his case. If it is
not clear that the Constitution, read in the light of its history and
purposes, supports his claim, he should not win.
In constitutional litigation, this offshoot of ordinary burden
of proof concepts was a t one time viewed as an especially import a n t guiding principle-the "doctrine of reasonable doubt."
Indeed, this principle was a canon of constitutional interpretation
(albeit strained by the aberration of Lochner) in constitutional
~
law casebooks as late as the 1940's and early 1 9 5 0 ' ~It. ~managed
to survive the Lochner era, and indeed was marvelously propped
up by the various decisions sustaining the major New Deal innovations under the contract clause,76the commerce clause,77and
75. See, e.g., W. DODD,CASESAND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW52 (5th ed.
1954). The doctrine of reasonable doubt in constitutional litigation operates much as it
does in criminal law: a statute should not be ruled invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. The application of the standard raises
certain questions. For instance, does a 5-4 decision invalidating a state law show that there
still exists a reasonable doubt? The apparent answer is no, although various commentators
have argued for Court restraint or for the requirement of a supermajority. But cf. Johnson
v. Louisiana, 406 U S . 356 (1972), where in a criminal case, the Court held, 5-4, that a
non-unanimous jury verdict (9-3) did not violate due process by circumventing the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Regarding majority verdicts by a minority of the full court (some members being
absent), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote in City of New York v. Miln, 33 U S . (8 Pet.)
118, 122 (1834) that:
The practice of this court is not (except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver
any judgment in cases where constitutional questions are involved, unless four
judges concur in opinion, thus making the decisions that of a majority of the
whole court.
Note also the remonstrance by Justice Blackmun against action by a "bob-tailed
court," in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chemical, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
76. See, e.g., Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1954).
77. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
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the tax-spend clause.78
The demise of the "doctrine of reasonable doubt" is a major
event in modern constitutional law that has been little noticed.
The process began in the First Amendment cases. Such cases
did not come to the Supreme Court in any numbers until 1925.
In that year, the Gitlow v. New York70decision incorporating the
First Amendment into the Fourteenthso opened the door to
numerous challenges to actions taken by state and local governm e n t ~ . ~Despite
'
a long rear-guard action by Justice Frankfurter" and some of his colleagues, it has come to be a wellaccepted tenet of the Supreme Court that when a claim touches
the First Amendment, a "preferred freedom" is invoked. More
recently, this "preferred freedoms" concept has spread to other
~ ~ to the "fundamental rights"
fields deemed " f ~ n d a m e n t a l "and
branch of the "new" substantive equal p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~
It may well be that such subtle shifts in burdens of proof and
presumptions in constitutional cases are a most important aspect
of the substantive due process spirit, even if not a t first perceived
as such. Little noticed by laymen, because seemingly mere arcane
technicalities, such shifts materially affect outcome^.^ In this
78. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U S . 548 (1937).
79. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
80. The validity of that incorporation has recently been denied by the Supreme Court
of Utah in a decision reminiscent of re-enactments of 100-year-old civil war battles-where
the participants forget the make-believe nature of the engagement. State v. Phillips, 540
P.2d 936 (Utah 1975). Cf. Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md.
1967) (an unsuccessful attack on the constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself).
81. Justice Stone's footnote 4 in his dissent in United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) is generally conceded to be the starting point for the
"preferred freedoms" concept under the First Amendment. Similar sentiments were expressed in Ex parte Endo, 323 U S . 283 (1944) and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
173 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U S . 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Frankfurter traces the emergence of the "mischievous phrase" of "preferred freedoms,"
concluding that the concept has never been supported by a majority of the Court. He goes
on to note that "the objection to . . . the phrase . . . is that it expresses a complicated
process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula . . . making for mechanical
jurisprudence." Id. a t 96. See also McKay, The Preference For Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1182 (1959).
83. This spread of the "preferred freedoms" approach is exemplified by litigation
undergirding with special warning requirements the criminal procedure guarantee that a
confession be voluntary. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U S . 436 (1966).
84. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U S . 618 (1969) (right to travel); Karst, Invidious
Discrimination: Justice Douglas a n d the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process"
Formula, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV.716 (1969).
85. It is in this context that the "overbreadth doctrine" should be examined. The
doctrine is a product of the fundamental rights approach, especially in the area of First
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way the bench asserts, sub silentio but powerfully, its own perception of what is merely a constitutional value and thus safely
left to the ordinary process of litigation, and what is "fundamental" and thus necessarily placed on a pedestal.
Surely, the recent federal circuit court decision finding an
unconstitutional infringement of freedom of expression in an
anti-"topless" dancing ordinance would seem asinine without the
. ~ ~ Second
pedestal effect of the preferred freedoms r a t i ~ n a l eThe
Circuit noted that "there is only a modicum of expression" involved in dancing topless. "But that modicum is one of constitutional significance, both to the dancers who earn a livelihood by
providing their particular form of entertainment, and, perhaps
more, to the customers . . . who for a variety of reasons . . .
choose not to avail themselves of diversions deemed more tasteful
or culturally rewarding by others."87 Examples in the Supreme
Court itself of decisions that could not have been made easily
without a rather strong "preferred freedoms" gloss on the First
Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
(doctrine applied to right to travel and right of association). The decisional technique
employed in "overbreadth" cases is not to adjudicate the facts of the case actually before
the Court, but to imagine all the situations to which the statute by its terms "might" seem
to apply, and to nullify the statute if any such imagined application would violate a
fundamental right. Thus, overbreadth litigation is "might be" litigation. It smacks of an
advisory opinion with a bite, and the immediate offender may escape deserved censure.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), and a companion case, Civil Service
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), divided
courts-expressing a more moderate spirit than found in Aptheker-sustained statutes
restricting partisan political activity by public employees and rejected attacks that the
statutes were void for being fatally overbroad. The majorities found that even though some
proscribed activities might be protected by the First Amendment, invalidating the entire
statutes was not warranted. The Court said that "particularly where conduct and not
merely speech are involved we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
413 U.S. a t 615.
The dissenters in Broadrick took a different view of the overbreadth doctrine, noting
that in a free speech context, "narrowly drawn statutes" are required to avoid "a chilling
effect" on First Amendment freedoms. They disagreed with the majority's distinguishing
between conduct and pure speech where both are protected by the First Amendment.
86. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1975).
87. Id. a t 1048. See also Attwood v. Purcell, 402 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1975). There
a law making it a crime to "wilfully and lewdly" expose one's private parts in any place
"where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby" was voided on
First Amendment grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.
So far the Supreme Court has avoided meeting the nude dancing issue frontally, but
has indicated that although "nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of
protected expression," it "might be" entitled to First Amendment protection under some
circumstances. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
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Amendment include the recent series of "flag" cases.RRIn this
,~~
same tradition of "offensive" protest is Cohen v. C a l i f ~ r n i ain
which a majority of the Court held the wearing of a jacket bearing
the phrase "F -the Draft" in a corridor outside a courtroom
in Los Angeles to be constitutionally protected from a prosecution
for "maliciously and wilfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct."
The point is not that these decisions and others like them are
wrong. But they are extreme, and the question is whether they
are not unsupported by the text or purposes of the First Amendment absent the judicial "preferred freedoms" gloss. Indeed, in
the cause of protecting the rather petty conduct challenged in
these cases, may not these decisions cheapen the value they are
intended to promote? The essence of humor is an intellectual
grasp of incongruity. Is there a lack of a sense of humor in these
recent judicial postures concerning bare-breasted dancing and
obscene words on jackets in courtrooms?
Although beyond the scope of this article, it might be suggested that a number of judicial invalidations of governmental
power in recent years, even though nominally supported b y a
clause more precise on its face than "due process," are as much
candidates for inclusion under the "new substantive due process"
rubric as are the more recent decisions on birth control and abortion. The test for including such cases would be whether the
ground of decision is reasonably supported by the history and
purposes of the relevant clause, or by any meaning logically inferable from its history and purpose or its function in respect to
other parts of the constitutional order.g0This is not to say that
all of the creative decisions are wrong. It is merely to suggest that
because of reliance on a clause that does not speak to the point,
some recent decisions are very poorly rationalized and supported
by little more than a "preferred freedoms" crutch.
Some of the decisions may be explained by specially protective judicial feelings concerning Vietnam protest activities. Unpopular policies, such as the Vietnam War, cause over-reaction
88. Spence v. Washington, 418 U S . 405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566
(1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
89. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
90. Cf. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALEL.J.
920, 949 (1973). Ely makes a similar point this way: 'YBlefore the Court can get to the
"balancing" stage, before it can worry about the next case or the case after that (or even
about its institutional position) it is under an obligation to trace its premises to the charter
from which it derives its authority." (Emphasis in original).
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that is not confined to the political arena.g1Yet this explanation
cannot account for decisions such as the one overturning an anti"topless" dancing ordinance. Unlike the politically relevant
"communication" on the jacket of the boy outside the California
courtroom, there was no message on the bosom of the barroom
dancer .92
Of course, it may be argued, and it has been, that those who
criticize the courts for non-Constitution-based jurisprudence in
respect to some decisions involving the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment merely disagree with the particular results
reached by the Court.g3Conversely, it may be argued that those
who agree with the Court's results are especially prone to discover-with the C o u r t e i t h e r an historicalg4or inferentialg%exus
with the "purpose" of a constitutional clause or set of clauses.

C . "Incorporation Doctrine" Cases: Subtle Reinforcers of
"Fundamental Rights" Reasoning
A special, discretionary "natural justice" problem arises
with respect to the question of "incorporation" of some or all of
the Bill of Rights provisions into the Fourteenth Amendment,
making them enforceable against the states as well as the na.~~
the continuance of the official doctional g o ~ e r n m e n t Despite
trine that the Bill of Rights, as such, limits only the national
government, most of the actual restrictions apply today with
equal force to the states. This feat has been accomplished in our
time, and most of it within the last fifteen years, by the Supreme
Court's "finding" that the single word "liberty" in the due pro91. In an analogous field, we have not yet begun to count up the case-precedent
damage to the ongoing Presidency caused by President Nixon and the manner of his
downfall. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. Unless in hedonistic terms, some things speak for themselves.
93. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 949 n.147 (1973).
94. Justice Black's penchant for rewriting history in order to achieve new constitutional doctrine nominally by "logical derivation" from the document rather than by overt
"natural justice" reasoning has been criticized by Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 SUP.CT. REV.119.
95. See Justice Goldberg's opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286-318 (1964).
96. The "taking" clause in the Fifth Amendment seems to have been the first clause
incorporated, at least in effect if not in the exact language of incorporation. See Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The free speech principle in the First
Amendment was "assumed" to be part of the Fourteenth Amendment in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), and never doubted thereafter. Most of the "incorporation"
debate, however, has concerned the numerous guarantees relating to criminal procedure.
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cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains all of the
basic thoughts laboriously spelled out by the Founding Fathers
in the Bill of Rights. Put another way, a "substantive" approach
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has historically been the necessary precondition of having a receptacle
available into which could be poured the Bill of Rights in whole
or in part.97
The relevant point here is that the Supreme Court has
shaped the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment into
almost a carbon copy of the Bill of Rights by a process of reasoning that has preserved maximum discretion to itself. Although
not always admitted,gsthis is the spirit of "natural justice" review
par excellence. This may be good, as it is in the view of some
commentators, because it provides a basis to avoid straitjacketing modern criminal procedure in the outworn dress of old
forms,99but it certainly should be recognized for what it is.
In broadest perspective, there are three possible approaches
to the "incorporation" question. Each approach would secure to
the Court a different degree of discretion to promulgate a judgemade code of rights and procedures restricting state and local
governments. The first, which would provide the least discretion
on details-despite a major impact in result-would consist of a
simple pronouncement that "total incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment was the intent of the
drafters. Justice Black espoused this view in his debate with Justice Frankfurter in their opinions in Adamson v. California,loO
97. See Harris, Due Process of Law, 42 AM. POL.SCI.REV.32 (1966).
98. Note Justice Frankfurter's opinion that a fundamental rights-natural law focus
does "not leave judges a t large"; because the "vague contours of the Due Process Clause
. . . . [are] deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession. . . . [due process] is not to be derided as resort to a revival of 'natural law'."
Rochin v. California, 342 U S . 165, 170-71 (1952).
Although concurring in the result on the basis of the as yet unincorporated Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination principle, Justice Black sharply criticized the majority
opinion because he found "no express constitutional language granting judicial power to
invalidate every state law of every kind deemed 'unreasonable' or contrary to the Court's
notion of civilized decencies." Id. a t 176. (Emphasis in original).
99. Cf. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF.L. REV.
929 (1965) (warning that the discretionary nature of the "incorporation" doctrine may lead
and
the Court to devise too detailed a code of criminal procedure-constitutionalized
impregnable).
THEADOITIONOF
100. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See also FLACK,
THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
(1908).
For a forceful criticism of Justice Black's "historical" finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states see Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?-The Original
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where, for the time being, the Court refused to incorporate the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth?' In the view of one perceptive commentator, there
was an aspect of special pleading to Black's position. A straightforward process of "total incorporation" avoids the need to expand the Fourteenth Amendment by "substantive due processfundamental rights" reasoning in order to find room for the Bill
of Rights. Thus, by "total incorporation," Justice Black could
have his "incorporation" cake but not have to eat substantive
due process with all its connotations of legitimating Lochner-type
attacks on economic and social legislation.ln2
An intermediate approach, often taken and often called
"selective incorporation," is to engage in a natural justice process
of reasoning to ascertain whether the particular Bill of Rights
clause invoked constitutes a fundamental right. If the answer is
"yes," then the whole clause-with meaning identical to its
meaning in federal trials-applies to the states. This is actually
a theory of total incorporation of "selected" Bill of Rights clauses.
Justice Brennan and others have championed this approach.InD
The third approach may be called "partial incorporation of
selected Bill of Rights clauses," or simply "selective selective
incorporation." Guided by a "fundamental value" reasoning process, the Court applies only the essential core of the selectively
incorporated Bill of Rights clause to the states. By way of example, when the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment
was incorporated "selectively," the accompanying federal exclusionary rule was left behind,lo4although later picked up.'"'. Of
course, insofar as fundamentality is the basic test under this approach, the exclusionary rule could be dropped again in a reassessment of "fundamentality ."Io6
Understanding, 2 STAN.L. REV.5 (1949). Justice Black replied to Professor Fairman in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
101. Incorporation did occur later. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
102. See generally Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights?-The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN.L. REV.140, 167 (1949).
103. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (Brennan, J.).
104. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
105. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the exclusionary rule was applied to the
states but no rationale commanded majority support.
106. Such a reassessment seems possible in light of the especially strong disenchantment with the exclusionary rule among members of the Burger Court. See, e.g., Chief
Justice Burger's dissents in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971). Significantly, the Court has declined to extend the exclusionary rule to grand
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The "selective selective incorporation" approach has operated in an especially interesting fashion in the recent federalization of jury trial cases. The Supreme Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires jury trials a t the state level too,
even for minor offenses, because the Sixth Amendment right to
~ ~ ~the details of jury trial are not
jury trial is " f ~ n d a r n e n t a l . "But
"fundamental." Hence, the states are free to allow conviction on
non-unanimous verdicts,lo8and to experiment with juries of fewer
than 12.1°9But a t this point the "selective selective incorporation" approach seems to boomerang and shrink the federal right
in the federal courts too. Although federal courts traditionally
utilize only 12-person juries and unanimous verdicts, these can
become optional practicesl10since they are neither spelled out in
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The issue could be a
major one in the current term of the Court. While this article was a t press, the Court on
Dec. 9, 1975 decided Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975), upholding admissibility of
an inculpatory statement made after two "Miranda warnings" and no request for a lawyer.
Arrested in connection with several robberies, Mosley received Miranda warnings, declined to discuss the robberies, and questioning ceased. Later, another detective gave fresh
warnings, then questioned Mosley about an unrelated murder and obtained the statement
used a t Mosley's trial for murder. See also Ohio v. Gallagher, 38 Ohio St. 2d 291, 313
N.E.2d 396 (1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975) (confession to parole officer after
Miranda warnings given by police); Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 561 (1975) (questioning of accused out of presence of counsel after
admonition by counsel to police to refrain from questioning). See generally Cord, NeoIncorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process Clause, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 215
(1975).
107. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In his opinion for the majority,
Justice White sought to recast the "fundamentality" test of selective incorporation from
the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" formulation in Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), to a formulation phrased as "necessary to an Anglo-American regime
of ordered liberty." Id. a t 149 n.14. This purported shift from a "universal" natural justice
focus as in Palko to an American focus in Duncan is a difference more semantical than
real. The important thing is that the judicial search still is for "fundamentality," a wholly
judge-controlled process. Because we are all more culture-bound than we can admit, the
difference in "fundamentality" as between a "natural justice" focus and an "American
justice" focus may be indistinguishable. Indeed, Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissenting,
seemed to concur in resting incorporation analysis on "the American traditions and our
system of government," 391 U.S. a t 176, but they read the tea leaves quite differently on
"fundamentality" in respect to the need for jury trial for lesser offenses.
108. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (a 10-2 conviction does not violate
the "incorporated" jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (due process was not violated by a 9-3 conviction in a case tried prior
to the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth).
109. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (6-person jury upheld as not violating
"incorporated" Sixth Amendment).
110. The odd split in the Court in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and
Justice Powell's "swing vote," apparently left jury unanimity as a requirement in federal
criminal trials but not in state criminal trials. As to the size of federal juries, however,
the Court has recently sanctioned the use of smaller than 12-person juries in civil cases.
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the Bill of Rights nor found to be fundamental.
Other results also flow from the persistence of the idea that
only the "fundamental rights" embodied in the Bill of Rights are
part of the "basic liberties" of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
natural justice rationale for incorporating a particular clause
tends to spill over into the merits. It provides a basis for-and in
a subtle way may actually induce-the Court to remake the
clause on an expanded "natural justice" basis, once it is incorporated. A good example is Malloy v. Hogan,ll1where, in the process
of incorporating the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the Court expanded considerably the federal right itself.lt2Moreover, the unceasing focus on the question
of "fundamentality" has prevented the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from being limited by the Bill of Rights.
As a result, the clause has remained a source of new fundamental
principles with which to challenge new forms of governmental
action, or old forms that no previous generation thought of challenging.l13
In short, the process of incorporating substantially all of the
"specific" guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
-

-

-

-

-

Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (use of a 6-person jury upheld). For a general
discussion of the danger of the "reverse incorporation" effect see Morgan, From Maxwell
to Duncan-Progress or Regression?, in LAWAND JUSTICE:
ESSAYS
IN HONOR
OF ROBERT
S.
RANKIN
149 (G. Beck ed. 1970).
In light of these untoward problems, this author tentatively suggests that a fourth
approach to the incorporation process may be preferable and would have a limiting effect
on judicial discretion. This approach would start with Justice Black's "total incorporation" premise, but then use non-fundamentality-supported by considerations drawn
from another constitutional principle, federalism-to exempt the states from certain details associated with the Bill of Rights. In effect, this would be Justice Black plus the
recent jury trial cases, and would accord with Mr. Justice Powell's desire not to change
the traditional practices in trials held in federal courts.
111. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
112. Malloy had already pleaded guilty to the gambling misdemeanor of "poolselling." Therefore, when he refused to answer questions about events surrounding his
arrest and conviction, the state court found no reasonable fear of further incrimination.
Justice Brennan, for the Court, was willing to hypothesize that if the questions elicited
the names of Malloy's associates in the prior offense, if the associates were still committing
offenses, and if Malloy had violated his probation by joining in these offenses, Malloy
might have reasonable fear of fresh incrimination. Id. a t 12-13.
In dissent, Justice White expostulated that the Court had virtually created a new
absolute. "Theoretically, under some unknown but perhaps possible conditions any fact
is potentially incriminating. But if this be the rule, there obviously is no reason for the
judge, rather than the witness, to pass on the claim of privilege. The privilege becomes a
general one against answering distasteful questions." Id. a t 37.
113. Note the "incorporation-plus" language of Justice Murphy in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,124 (1947). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,171 (1973) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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Amendment has not been one of immaculate conception.
Achieved by use of a "fundamental rights" concept with explicit
natural law-natural justice overtones, the way has been opened
for an ongoing jurisprudence focusing far less on the documentary
and historic origins of constitutional rights and guarantees than
on values perceived by the Court as natural and necessary for the
good of society. Indeed, the heady thought that the judiciary may
be the conscience of the people114flows far more easily from the
value-questing process of natural justice reasoning than from the
tedious process of documentary analysis required to ascertain
original meanings and purposes and the reach of plausible inference .'I5

This overview treatment, up to this point, has dealt not just
with substantive due process but with the general question of
unguided judicial discretion which that term evokes. It has been
observed that the initial acceptance of judicial review was on a
basis more practical than principled, thus begging rather than
facing the question of judicial discretion. In fact, the relationship
of "natural justice" to the written text of the Constitution, and
the institution of review itself, has never been sorted out. Hence,
this article suggests that, apart from the special area of "institutional review," a persistent tendency toward loose fundamentalvalues thinking has been a constant enticement toward broad
judicial discretion, even though natural justice has never been
conceived of as an enforceable body of law.
The focus of the preceding analysis has been on what might
be called the substantive due process spirit, or better, the natural
justice spirit, rather than on cases commonly labeled as substantive due process cases. It is time now to pay brief heed to the one
area where the Supreme Court has overtly used the due process
clause, in its nonprocedural cast, to nullify legislation because it
was arbitrary, extreme, or unreasonable, or because it trenched
on fundamental values: namely, the Lochner v. New York116line
114. The thought is captured in Justice Field's statement that "this Court stands for
the whole country, and as such it is truly 'of the people, by the people, and for the
people.' " Correspondence Between Mr. Justice Field and the Other Members of the Court
with Regard to his Retiring from the Bench, Oct. 12, 1897, 42 L. Ed. 1219, 1221. See
THESUPREME
COURTAND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
(1970).
generally BICKEL,
115. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
116. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emerg-
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of cases. The focus then will shift to some significant recent developments by which the Court, perhaps with less intellectual honesty than demonstrated in the Lochner-line of cases, has developed even more stringent doctrines for overturning legislation and
sharing policymaking power.

A.

Lochner and Company

If the Court goes out of its way, with little or no constitutional warrant, to protect someone from an "uncommonly silly
law," as Justice Stewart put it in the contraceptives case,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 117 there can be little objection. This
is a good example of use of the substantive due process concept to take care of the "unprovided-for case" beyond the
reach of explicit constitutional guarantees. But this is not what
was wrong with the sequence of cases typified by Lochner u.
New York. Those cases involved invalidations not of old,
anachronistic, "silly" laws b u t of recent attempts of the
state legislatures118and the Congressllg to grapple with certain
impacts of the industrial revolution on workers,120 business
ence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ.L. REV.419 (1973). He approvingly quotes
Mr. Justice Douglas' off-the-bench statement that "the problem of constitutional adjudication . . : is to keep the power of government unrestrained by the social or economic
theories that one set of judges may entertain." But, Strong adds, Douglas, "of all postNebbia Justices has experienced the seductiveness of transgressions of that ideal." Id. a t
455.
117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a discussion of this extremely odd case see notes 186-89
and accompanying text infra.
118. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (requirement that
ice manufacturers obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity prior to entering into
business); Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (regulation of employment agency fees
voided because such a business is "not affected with the public interest"); Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (ban against employment agencies which collected fees held
to be an "arbitrary and oppressive" prohibition of a useful business); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915) (prohibition of "yellow dog" contracts an unconstitutional infringement
of "right to make contracts"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (law prohibiting
employment in bakeries for more than 60 hours per week an "unnecessary and arbitrary"
interference with the right to contract); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (statute
prohibiting any act in the state to effect insurance on any property in Louisiana unless
company had complied with Louisiana law deprived persons of liberty without due process).
119. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U S . 525 (1923) (District of Columbia
statute prescribing minimum wages for women overturned as a "naked, arbitrary exercise" of legislative power without regard to the contracts or the nature of the business);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (ban on "yellow dog" contracts for interstate
railroad employees overturned as an unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract).
120. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U S . 525 (1923) (low wages); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (long working days; unhealthy working conditions).
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competitors,121and consumers.122Not all these invalidations were
based on traditionally accepted principles, such as the objective
concept that if ratemaking results in regulations so onerous as to
be confiscatory, they lack due process or even trench on the "public taking" concept.ln Rather, the tests of constitutionality employed were so vague that a quite inconsistent pattern of invalida~~
in judicial decision is a sign that
tions r e ~ u 1 t e d . lInconsistency
a legal standard is either deficient or absent, and that a court,
acting creatively, is embarked on a policy formation process without the aid of the legislative mechanism.125
The "liberty of contract" principle with which the Court met
the early wages and hours legislation is not so much a decisional
principle as a slogan, for the right to contract has always been
subject to restraints imposed to achieve higher social good. For
example, the Statute of Frauds regulates contracting form,Iz6contracts to commit a crime are void ab initio,12' the concept of a just
price for services has ancient lineage in the common law,12sand
so on. Given this reality about restraints upon contracting, and
given the absence of explicit constitutional guidance (unless we
reach the confiscation concept), how could the judiciary develop
a workable standard to decide when to negate, and when not to
121. See, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (a state law prohibiting
manufacturers from using shoddy in bedding was struck down).
122. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (regulation of gasoline price voided); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (regulation of ticket
resale price voided); Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (regulation of weights
of loaves of bread voided).
123. See The Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886) (confiscatory rates);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 269 U.S. 393 (1922); cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U S . 590 (1962).
124. See cases collected in CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,
LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS,
OF THE UNITED
STATES,
S. DOC.NO. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1332-35
THECONSTITUTION
(1973).
125. The Lochner era also recognized the existence of some "personal freedoms."
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate children as one
chooses); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to study German language in a
private school); cf. Whitney v. California, 264 U.S. 357,373-80 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes,
J.J., concurring) (right of free speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes
& Brandeis, J.J., dissenting) (right of free speech).
126. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379, 66 N.E. 1005 (1903).
127. See, e.g., Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1924); Hoggard v. Dickerson,
180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S.W. 1135 (1914).
128. See the discussion of common law principles in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). See also Read, Mercantilism: The Old English Pattern of
63 (C. Read rev. ed. 1968).
RECONSIDERED
a Controlled Economy, in THECONSTITUTION
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negate, a legislative act of social or economic regulation? For after
all, as Holmes put it, "law is not a science," it is "ernpiri~al."'~~
The development obviously could come only by appeal to
some extra-constitutional principle. The one the majority of the
Court found was laissez-faire, which was, said Justice Holmes in
dissent, "an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain."130 To Holmes, the uninformative word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment "is perverted when it is held
to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law."131
The Lochner sequence is a good illustration of the fact that
a natural law or substantive due process spirit of judging gives
rise to three distinct problems. The first is legitimacy. Absent
reasonably explicit guidance in the higher law, by what right does
a court strike down acts of legislation, thus derogating the work
of the two political branches-for both are involved in legislation-and thus negating the only regularized process we have for
ascertaining the popular
129. Hblmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1870).
Achieving the needed empiricism is difficult enough in the context of a trial of a
person. But judicial review forces the Court into a "trial" of a statute, as Mr. Justice Black
has put it in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 787 (1945), and the range of
relevant "constitutional facts," and the manner of getting them before the Court, pose
problems nonexistent in common law judging. See Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA.L. REV.337 (1966); Karst, Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV.75; Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SUPREME
AND SUPREME
LAW47,48 (Cahn ed. 1954); Miller & Barron,
COURT
The Supreme Court, The Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices:
A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV.1187 (1975).
Justice Black amplified his point (and directly supported it by citation to substantive
due process cases) as follows:
This new pattern of trial procedure makes it necessary for a judge to hear
all the evidence offered as to why a legislature passed a law and to make findings
of fact as to the validity of those reasons. If under today's ruling a court does
make findings, as to a danger contrary to the findings of the legislature, and the
evidence here "lends support" to those findings, a court can then invalidate the
law. In this respect, the Arizona County Court acted, and this Court today is
acting, as a "super-legislature."
325 U.S. a t 788.
130. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
131. Id. a t 76.
132. For a review and critique of the suggestion that a distinction can be drawn
between "improper" judicial hegemony over economic and social matters, and "proper"
judicial hegemony over freedom of expression, see McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP.CT. REV.34.
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The second problem, already noted, is inconsistency. The
third is institutional feasibility. New principles or values judicially selected for special protection are broad, and they intersect
ambiguously with the details of industrial, social, and political
life. Their just application depends on factual appraisal to ascertain whether the principle itself is being served or hurt by the
statute in question in any particular case. A legislative-type
process of factfinding and an administrative process of mixed
rulemaking and adjudication are needed to illumine new principles before they can be handled with assurance-modes of operation not transferable to the judicial function without risk to the
"neutral" judging function itself .I3' Nonetheless, the Court may
strive, as it did in the Abortion Cases, to do research on its own,
to open the door wide to amici curiae briefs, and to broaden
judicial notice. But the Court is not well suited to operating like
a constitutional convention. When it does so, the accustomed
adversary method of proof is perverted, and the parties may see
the case slip out of their hands on a ~ p e a 1 . l ~ ~
133. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
134. What is really meant by the oft-mentioned concept of "neutral" principles is not
so much the content of a decision, and certainly not its impact, but the style of operation.
We contain our judges by method, and demand justification of their results by reason.
Creativity is to be distinguished from creative leaps. As Bickel put it, "The highest
OF CONSENT
morality almost always is the morality of process." A. BICKEL,THEMORALITY
123 (1975). The legal order is an accommodation; it should not march t o moral imperatives.
135. In asking for rehearing in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Georgia complained
that the Court had decided the case in part on judicial notice and inputs from amici curiae
briefs which Georgia had no opportunity to rebut. Consider the following:
The point is that the Appellees had no opportunity a t any stage in this case to
present evidence which would show that the State's regulatory scheme regarding
abortion is reasonably related to, and even demanded by hazards to, maternal
health in the first trimester . . . . The Court has taken judicial notice of innumerable facts and factors, some which are expressly referred to in the Court's
decision and some which are unknown to the parties but which apparently were
extricated from various sources by the Court's diligent research, which facts
nevertheless should be subject to refutation and counter-evidence since they
form the foundation for the Court's opinion and compromising dichotomy of
constitutional stages of fetal growth. With no opportunity for Appellees to demonstrate the factual basis, in terms of current medical science, that its interest
attaches a t a particular point in the natural development of a human fetus, the
Court has seized upon the convenient point of "viability" and crystalized constitutional command which bars state action.
Petition for Rehearing a t 2-4, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (quoted in Miller &
Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System and the Flow of Information to the
Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV.1187, 1216 (1975)).
Equally, or even more, disconcerting to counsel can be the Court's shifting of the
constitutional issue itself after briefing. This occurred when the primary issue involved
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The "Substantive Equal Protection" Syndrome

An especially dramatic development in recent judicial review
of legislative and executive acts has been the resurrection of the
equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from its original puerile status (at least in nonracial matters) as
"the usual last resort of constitutional argument."13~ndeed,one
may raise the question whether some recent judicial perceptions
of the equal protection clause are so incompatible with the basic
mode of democratic lawmaking through the legislative process as
to make this branch of judicial review a significant threat to
popular control of public policy choices and even of public expenditure. 13'
This topic is discussed extensively by others,lsRso the comments here will be brief and evaluative. When the equal protection clause is used to bar official racial discrimination, it is dealing with the clearly intended constitutional concept of equal status, and is not substantive due process in form or in spirit.lss Nor
is substantive due process smuggled into the equal protection
clause when the Court recognizes that most legislative classifications are inexact, and uses the clause only to void those which
transcend the bound of reason. An example of a case in which the
Supreme Court wielded the equal protection clause in this manner is McGowan v. Maryland.'" There, in rejecting an equal proin the congressional redistricting case, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), was
"switched" from the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause to art. I, § 2. See
DIXON,
supra note 11, a t 183.
136. Buck v. Bell, 274 U S . 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (upholding statute directing
compulsory sterilization of hereditary imbeciles in state institutions).
137. It is common knowledge that orders for expanded fleets of school buses as a
consequence of remedial integration orders in public school cases have been a t least a
slight boost to a troubled automotive industry. On occasion a direct judicial tax levy or
forced sale of state assets has been suggested or threatened. See, e.g., Griffin v. County
Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U S . 218,233 (1964) (tax levy for funds to reopen county
schools); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (money to upgrade mental
hospitals).
138. See, e.g., Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More
Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.89.
139. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (prohibition of interracial marriage). Race is not so much a judicially created "suspect" category as it is a category
"forbidden" by explicit direction in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Although
the outcome may be the same, in theory there is room for balancing the competing
interests when classifications are judicially determined to be "suspect." On the other
hand, in "forbidden" racial classifications something like a per se rule of invalidity operates, with the possible exception of temporary, remedial racial classifications.
On the problem of reverse discrimination see De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U S . 312
(1974) and the extensive comment it engendered.
140. 366 U S . 420 (1961).
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tection attack on Maryland's patchwork-quilt list of exemptions
in its Sunday-closing law, Chief Justice Warren writing for the
Court used this language (borrowed almost verbatim from a 1911
:

State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.'j2

A substantive due process spirit is contained, however, in
the strict scrutiny doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in
the 1960's as a special gloss on the equal protection clause. The
doctrine applies whenever there is a legislative classification affecting enjoyment of what the Court discovers to be a fundamental right, or whenever the Court categorizes a legislative classifiPut pithily, the strict scrutiny doctrine
cation as suspect per se.143
is this: We, the Supreme Court, feel that some rights are so fundamental t h a t any legislative classification which operates to
deny the "right" to some and not to others will not be upheld
unless the government sustains the burden of showing that a
compelling state interest is served by the classification imposed.
The second component of the formula, shifting the burden of
proof to the state, is as important as the first.
A good example of the strict scrutiny approach is contained
'~~
concerned the once common
in Shapiro v. T h ~ r n p s o n .Shapiro
requirement of a l-year residence in a state as a condition of
qualifying for welfare payments. After identifying interstate
travel as a fundamental right, the Court subjected to strict scrutiny-and rejected-the state's purported justifications of the
residency requirement, which were couched in terms of planning
the welfare budget, avoiding double payment, encouraging work
by new arrivals, and discouraging immigration solely to obtain
welfare benefits.
There are few classifications which could be said to be based
on truly vital interests.145Certainly a requirement of 1-year resi141. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
142. 366 U S . a t 425-26.
143. The view that race is a suspect classification device is supported by explicit
constitutional language and purpose as discussed in note 139 supra. Other Courtrecognized suspect types of classifications are not so supported; e.g., alienage.
144. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
145. To all such broad statements there are always exceptions, and one is that the
law always takes care of its own. Even in the heyday of the "right-privilege" distinction,
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dence in a state as a precondition to welfare eligibility'-16or to
voting status,'" or a requirement of property possession or of parenthood as a precondition to voting in a school election,'4Rwould
not qualify as classifications based on such vital necessity. Even
the Bank of the United States, which Chief Justice Marshall had
to say was "necessary and proper" in 1819 in order to constitutionalize it,'49was not supported by such a compelling governmental need that the nation could not survive very nicely after
the Bank was killed for political reasons in the 1 8 3 0 ' ~ . ~ ~ ~
The states have not fared well in their attempts to sustain
the burden of showing that a particular classification is compellingly needed.I5' In practical terms, this means that the Court's
power to assert that an interest affected by a classification is a
fundamental interest is tantamount to a power to place certain
matters beyond the effective grasp of the legislature. In addition
to interstate travel,lS the list of fundamental rights now includes
virtually all aspects of voting and access to the ballot,'" and
when courts were holding that a person who took a license had no right to a notice or
hearing before revocation, the attorney's license was viewed differently. In 1873, the Supreme Court reversed a summary disbarment of a lawyer, and Justice Field said that as
a "rule of natural justice" the attorney was entitled to notice and an opportunity to
explain and defend. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873).
146. Such a requirement was challenged and struck down in Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U S . 618 (1969). See text accompanying note 144 supra.
147. A similar requirement was challenged and struck down in Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
148. Such a requirement was challenged and struck down in Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
149. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U S . (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
150. The renewal of the charter of the Second Bank of the United States was passed
by Congress in 1832, only to be vetoed by President Jackson. The Bank breathed its last
in 1836.
151. Chief Justice Burger dissenting in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972),
stated: "Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state
interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever
satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will." Id. at 36364. Hut see American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U S . 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415
U S . 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U S . 431 (1971). These cases involved relatively
minor inhibitions such a s petition requirements; most were sustained. See also Richardson
v. Romirez, 418 U S . 24 (1974) (sustaining California's ex-felon disenfranchisement because of $ 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning "participation in rebellion or other
crime").
152. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 IJ.S.
393 (1975) (1-year durational residence requirement for divorce sustained). Sosna has
prompted the question whether "the Burger Court is preparing to reconsider the source
of the right to travel." Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A.L.
REV.1129 (1975).
153. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U S . 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968).
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limited aspects of access to judicial process including free transcripts and filing fees in criminal cases.154
The list does not yet encompass the inequalities associated
with unequal wealth distribution. In S u n Antonio Independent
School District u. Rodriguez,'" the Supreme Court left undisturbed the use of the traditional system of relying heavily on local
property taxes to finance public schools-a system that produces
significant differences in per pupil expenditure because of differences in levels of assessable property among the local school districts. The challengers in Rodriguez unsuccessfully asserted both
that education is a fundamental right and that wealth is a suspect
classification.
But consider the power the Court would have been wielding
had the four dissenters prevailed i n Rodriguez.ls6 A decision
that intrastate wealth differentials could not be reflected in
school expenditures would be tantamount to saying that local
government, as we have known it, is unconstitutional. Logically,
the interstate disparities between, for example, South Carolina
and California, should suffer the same fate. The impermissible
disparities also should include the differences in costs to state
residents of access to state colleges. Ultimately, the logical extension of such reasoning would lead to the conclusion that federalism is unconstitutional because it collides with a fundamental
right. Perhaps federalism is outmoded. Certainly, all students
who study the course "Conflict of Laws" today can easily get the
feeling that the question of what law is to be applied to an interstate contract has become so confused that federalism has had its
day. But to renounce local government or federalism by judicial
process on the theory that education has become a fundamental
right would make the old substantive due process nullification of
some wage and hour laws look insignificant by comparison. The
old battles were over our system of economics. Today's battles are
over our system of government, and demonstrate the continued
vibrancy of the fundamental rights-natural justice spirit of review.

C. T h e Principle of Principled Innocence
There are some special areas which might not be commonly
154. See, e.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 US. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 ITS. 12
(1956).
155. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
156. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented in Rodriguez.
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thought to have "new" substantive due process implications. One
such problem area is the product of what might be called the
"principle of principled innocence." It masquerades as procedural due process. It seems to sound in fairness and "neutral"
principles. It seems to remain true to the American characteristic
that although we often are uncertain of our ends, we are very
certain about the narrow range of means permitted to any American government. This is, of course, that concept guaranteed to
win applause in almost all settings-the concept of a fair hearing.
Almost no one opposes the right to a fair hearing in principle.
Indeed, if the state were to lift your driver's license, you would
wish to have a pyramid of hearings all the way to the Supreme
Court. But if so, would you be thinking in overly personal,
system-blocking terms, rather than in terms of the Kantian imperative that one should conduct himself so as to create universal
To bring this point to a head, one might ask whether in
certain areas of student rights and of welfare, broadly defined, the
Court sometimes requires hearings to be more formal than is
feasible, rather than allowing a simple notice-response procedure
to be used.158The Supreme Court's recent decision in Goss v.
Lopez,'" the student discipline case, may be a straw in the wind.
The Court, splitting 5 to 4, held that "as a general rule"'" notice
and a t least an informal hearing should precede removal of a
student from school. For the dissenters, Mr. Justice Powell said:
No one can forsee the ultimate frontiers of the new
"thicket" the Court now enters . . . .

....

. . . The student who is given a failing grade, who is not
promoted, who is excluded from certain extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a school reserved for children of less than
average ability, or who is placed in the "vocational" rather than
the "college preparatory" track, is unlikely to suffer any less
psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day for a
relatively minor infraction.
If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due process procedures whenever such routine school decisions are chal157. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
158. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA.L. REV.1267 (1975)

( a review of the hearing requirement in different contexts).
159. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
160. Id. at 576.
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lenged, the impact upon public education will be serious indeed. I6l

This is an in terrorem statement to be sure, but does it have
core validity? The majority position rests on the widely shared
desire that restraints and sanctions be as personalized as possible
in the cause of ultimate justice.162Yet, a t the same time, if a
hearing of the required level of formality is not feasible, either
because of the practical difficulties or because of the impact on
ongoing relationships that would result, the effect of such a requirement-made inflexible by being constitutionalized-could
be to force the termination of a program or policy. Indeed, unlike
substantive due process per se, where merits can and should be
probed and competing considerations balanced, a procedural
"overkill" grounded on conceptualism rather than empiricism
can operate to curb a governmental program without explicit
consideration of the full effect of the ruling.

D.

The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine

A variation of the "principle of principled innocenceo-that
is, effectively nullifying a program or policy in substantive due
process spirit through the ploy of imposing extreme procedural
niceties-is the recently broadened doctrine of irrebuttable pres u m p t i o n ~ .The
' ~ ~ idea is simple. Find a requirement stated without exceptions-for example, that pregnant school teachers must
quit teaching before the beginning of the fifth month of pregnancy as in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.lMPoint out
that not all teachers 5-months pregnant possess the characteristics which produced the "evil" the legislature was trying to avoid
and that to impose the rule without a hearing therefore amounts
to creating the irrebuttable presumption (factually fallacious in
some instances) that all teachers 5-months pregnant produce the
161. Id. a t 583-84.
162. The paradox is that personalization maximizes discretion, and hence the opportunity for both arbitrariness and inconsistency. There is an alternative construct of justice
which emphasizes the importance of general rules inflexibly applied.
163. For cases in which this doctrine is involved see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 1,aFleur, 414 U S . 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508
(1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). For perceptive commentary see Note.
Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STANL. REV.449 (1975); Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.L. REV.1534 (1974);
Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH.
L. REV.800 (1974). See also Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.CIV.RIGHTS-CIV.
Im.
L. REV.269, 308, 311, 319 (1975).
164. 414 U S . 632 (1974).
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undesired situation-discontinuity of instruction or lowered
physical capacity.16 Apart from the merits of any particular case,
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, if taken literally and
applied rigorously, operates like the "strict scrutiny" doctrine
under the equal protection clause to invalidate as unconstitutional much of the product of the conventional, fitful, inarticulate
legislative process.lR6The effect is to mandate rule by legislatures
composed of philosopher-kings, or if they cannot be found, rule
by federal district judges.
There is, of course, some hyperbole in these comments, but
the core truth may be uncomfortably large. It is one thing to make
constitutional rulings in the natural justice-substantive due process spirit, with the competing interests considered and balanced.
I t is a far more serious matter to make constitutional rulings in
formulary fashion without considering the weight of the competing interests. Equally important is the fact that in areas where
judicially mandated hearings are not feasible, the Court will have
casually created an absolute bar to the legislative policy involved.
In irrebuttable presumption cases there is something perilously
close to what has been called in another connection-namely, the
numbers game in reapportionment-"winning without actually
cheating."lR7
There are indications that the Supreme Court is beginning
to appreciate this problem. The pregnant teachers case still
stands and several other similar rulings have been rnade,IeRyet,
165. Just what was the purpose of the termination rule in LaFleur was never fully
clarified, a fact that weakened the Board's case. The original purpose may have been an
unarticulated feeling about sensibilities rather than continuity of instruction, and the
mere %week notice rule did not guarantee continuity of instruction. See 414 U.S. at 64143 nn.9 & 11.
166. On the subject of the legislative process, consider Judge Gesell's comment on
the "imprecise and poorly drafted" Freedom of Information Act in Washington Research
Project, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1973):
Accordingly, as is usually the case where the Court must attempt to apply this
imprecise and poorly drafted statute to a situation apparently never contemplated by Congress, it becomes necessary to resolve the controversy by reliance
on the high gloss which the learned decisions of this Circuit have been required
to place on the legislation.
Id. a t 935.
167. Neal, Raker u. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV.252, 287. See
also Dixon, supra note 11, a t 167-69, 437-39.
168. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973)
(invalidating a provision designed to bar food stamps from a n entire commune if it contains a member whose father is claiming him as a tax dependent); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 ( 1973) (overturning a Connecticut statute requiring nonresident tuition of students whose legal address was outside the state a t the time of application to the state
university system).
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the Court last June seemed prepared to abandon its course of
casual invalidation of general eligibility standards that do not
At issue was a Social Security Act
precisely fit all app1i~ations.l~~
survivor's benefits provision which defined "widow" so as to exclude surviving wives who had been married to the deceased for
less than nine months at the time of his death. Speaking for a
majority of six, which upheld the provision, Justice Rehnquist,
who had been a consistent dissenter in other irrebuttable presumption cases, recognized t h a t this prophylactic provision
against marrying for an expectancy would let some "investorwidows" benefit if they could nurse the deceased through nine or
more months of marriage, and could bar some "good-faith" widows whose marriage to the deceased was not motivated by a
golden egg expectancy. But he explained that most prophylactic
provisions are inexact, so that a requirement of exactness to avoid
any over-inclusion or under-inclusion would be "a virtual engine
of destruction for countless legislative judgments."170Justice
Rehnquist phrased the test to be employed in this manner:
The question is whether Congress, its concern having been
reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both
that a particular limitation or qualification would protect
against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.17'

E. T h e Substantive Due Process "Sleeper" i n Section 1983
More subtle even than the "principle of principled innocence," are what are known to lawyers as "title 42, section 1983
actions," based on the old Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Act
of 1871. Put crisply, about all section 1983 says is that you are a
"dirty bird" if you violate someone's constitutional rights. This
section provides civil sanctions if anyone acting under color of law
subjects any person "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."17*
169. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
170. Id. a t 2472-73.
171. Id. a t 2470.
172. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1970). The criminal code analogue to 8 1983, 18 U.S.C. Ej 242
(1970), is similar, but contains a slight textual variation. It uses the words "secured or
protected" rather than the single word "secured."
For a review of limitations on 8 1983 actions of a largely "procedural" nature see
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforccment o f C'onstitutional Protections (pt. I), 60 VA. L. REV.1 (1974).
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In section 1983 suits for injunctions against various state
practices, the "deprivation of constitutional rights" concept
flourishes in substantive due process spirit. It can be the basis for
judicial findings of violations of newly perceived fundamental
rights, followed by detailed remedial orders approaching judicial
takeover of the affected part of the state government.
An especially dramatic example is the recent sequence of
litigation in Alabama establishing a right to treatment for persons committed to state mental institution^,'^^ and upholding, in
substance, two exceedingly detailed district court decrees on the
The 35-point list in refuture operation of three in~tituti0ns.l~~
spect to one institution, and the 49-point list in respect to the
others, specified in fine detail minimum standards for treatment
procedures, records, staffing, equipment, per patient service ratios, and the like. The state had argued that compliance would
entail the expenditure annually of a sum equal to 60% of the state
budget excluding school financing. To ensure compliance, the
district court had also impliedly threatened-by the device of
reserving a ruling-the possibility of appointing "a Special Master for the purposes of selling or encumbering state lands" to
finance the new standards, or enjoining "state officials from authorizing expenditures for nonessential state function^."'^^ Similar "vigor" can be found in judicial rulings concerning the remaking of Arkansas' prison system176and the specification of new
173. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt
v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. '781
(M.D. Ala. 1971).
174. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Bryce and Searcy
State Hospitals); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Partlow State
School and Hospital).
175. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1317 (5th Cir. 1974). After the court orders,
one top administrator resigned and another was dismissed, both claiming that the reason
was pressure for compliance with the orders of Federal District Judge Johnson. Pursuant
to the court orders, the State of Alabama is proceeding with approximately 3,000 new
committal hearings for patients who were previously committed under procedures held
unconstitutional. The cost of the new hearings is estimated to be 3 million dollars. Judge
Johnson has said that as a result of his decisions the State's mental institution patient
population was reduced by 60 per cent. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1975, § 1 at 11, col. 1.
176. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The Court in Holt made this
threat:
Let there be no mistake in the matter: the obligation of the Respondents to
eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the legislature may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or indeed upon what Respondents may actually be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a
Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced by
the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 385.
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standards and modes of administration for New York City's Juvenile Detention Centers. 177
A striking feature of these cases, and others like them,17R
is
that they are handled without explicit reference to constitutional
clauses, or sometimes even to section 1983 itself. The whole tone
of the opinions is that of a pronouncement ex cathedra. The constitutional violation is apparently too obvious to be discussed.
The bulk of the opinions concern facts and prescriptions, reading
more like legislative committee reports than judicial opinions.
The majority justices in Lochner v. New York,17' in all their glory,
were never arrayed like the district court judges in some of these
latter-day section 1983 actions.180This is not to denigrate the fact
that there are atrocious conditions long overdue for correction.
Some of the evidence is hair-raising.Ig1Yet, when judges act as in
the Alabama mental hospitals situation, they are not merely adding woof to the warp of what Alexander Bickel has called the
; ~ ~ ~are performing the high pol"open-textured" c o n ~ t i t u t i o nthey
itical function of forcing legislatures and executives to face problems and assume responsibilities that they would prefer to ignore.
But judges cannot become administrators and budget-makers
without eroding not only the separation of powers, per se, but also
their own immunity from political accountability.lR3

F. The "Right to Privacy"
A delineation of the so-called "right" to privacy, or even a
full discussion of recent Supreme Court cases touching on this
interest, lies beyond the scope of this article. In the extensive
literature on the subject, several of the Court's recent actions in
regard to contraception or abortion are seen as manifestations of
a "new" substantive due process spirit, applying to new fields a
177. Martaralla v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
178. E.g., Rozecki v. Gaughn, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571 (8th Cir. 1968); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
179. 198 U S . 45 (1905).
180. C f . Matt. 6:28-29.
181. Four patients a t Partlow (one of the Alabama institutions) had died as a result
of understaffing, lack of supervision, and brutality a t the institution, including one grisly
incident in which a working patient inserted a garden hose into the rectum of a fellow
patient whom he was cleaning. Wyatt v. Adelholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1311 (5th Cir. 1974).
OF CONSENT
29 (1975).
182. A. BICKEL,THEMORALITY
183. See generally Oster & Doane, The Power of Our Judges; Are They Going Too
Far?, US.News & World Report, Jan. 19,1976, a t 29-34. There are signs that the Supreme
Court may wish to reduce somewhat the intake of broad class action challenges to statelocal administration. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976), decided while this
article was a t press.
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judicial power to declare new freedoms whether or not illumined
by the constitutional document, its setting, or its easily inferred
purposes.lS4The following notes only a few highlights.
As I have developed at length elsewhere,lg5it is possible to
avoid classifying the birth control case, Grisw old v. Connecticut, lg6 a s a unique "privacy" decision. True, Justice Douglas,
in good form then, skipped through the Bill of Rights like a
cheerleader-"Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . an I . . . ,
and so on, and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbral right.lg7But the Griswold case did not in fact involve
penumbral privacy in the bedroom. No search was a t issue. The
defendant was a birth control clinic operator and the real issue
was a derivative or penumbral First Amendment issue-a right
of access to certain kinds of information needed for effective implementation of the marital freedom of family planning. The real
"standing" issue was not whether Griswold in his own defense
should be allowed to raise a contraceptive-use freedom of his
clients, but whether he should be allowed to raise a First Amendment freedom of information claim of his clients.lgg
In other words, although the privacy label is tossed about
loosely as though it had some intrinsic meaning, what was a t
issue in Griswold was not repose, or an immunity against having
personal data about oneself disclosed, or protection against state
invasion of the home. What was a t issue was a particular freedom
of action.
Similarly, in the Abortion Decisions, Roe v. Wadelusand Doe
v. B o l t ~ n ,a' ~
freedom
~
of action was a t issue. What the invocation
of "privacy" does in these freedom of action cases is simply to
99

-

184. See, e . g ; ~ l ~ ,The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1972); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159; Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH.L. REV.197
(1965).
185. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law
of Privacy, 64 MICH.L. REV.197, 214 (1965).
186. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
187. For this graphic characterization the author is indebted to John Roche of BranL. REV.1410, 1421deis University. See also Henken, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM.
22 (1974).
188. Had the issue in Griswold not involved the "single bundle of rights" including

the use and dissemination of the contraceptives as well as information, but instead had
been limited to the issue of giving advice, it is likely that Justices Black and Stewart, the
dissenters, would have joined the majority on "free-speech grounds, but with no conscious
overlay of marital privacy." Dixon, supra note 185, a t 214.
189. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
190. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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italicize the word "personal" in the phrase "personal freedom"
because all freedoms are personal-some are just more personal
than others. But because "privacy" has no single, generally accepted meaning, the mold remains pure Lochner-a judicial
probe for the fundamentality of fundamental values not immediately apparent in the Constitution.
The Abortion Decisions raise a far more difficult question
than Griswold for at least two reasons. A new factor, the fetus,
must be considered, and the cultural overburden is far more intense because religious- philosophical viewpoints are involved.
Indeed, one might suggest t h a t the abortion issue is more
uniquely culture-bound than other constitutional issues. One
would have no doubt of the outcome if the Court were the product
of, and sitting in, either a devoutly Roman Catholic country embracing the theory of life a t conception, or an intensely agnostic
country with the opposite view. In the polyglot United States
some state legislatures take one view, others another.
In this situation, what should the public policy be, and what
should the Court's role be? A seemingly neutral position would
be not to impose the view of either the pro-abortion group or the
anti-abortion group on the other, but to leave the matter subject
to personal choice as restricted only by those sanctions which the
First Amendment places off-limits for government-religious
sanctions which a church, but not the state, can impose. From
this standpoint, legislatures trample on the neutral principle of
freedom of choice when they impose the anti-abortion view on
those who do not share it-arguably they transgress the First
Amendment-and, if so, the Court should intervene to restore
governmental neutrality and freedom of choice.
Although not by this reasoning process-or any very clear
reasoning process-the Court in effect did so rule in Roe u. Wade
by endorsing a freedom of choice in the pregnant woman (nominally with her physician's concurrence) for the first six months
of pregnancy.lgl The Court, however, did not opt for full freedom
191. In the first trimester of pregnancy, the decision whether to abort must be left
exclusively to the pregnant woman and her physician. During the second trimester, the
state may regulate the abortion procedure only in a manner reasonably related to maternal
health. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 164-65 (1973).
In reaching its decision with respect to the first six months of pregnancy, the Court
placed much stress on medical data. Such data, however, would be relevant only insofar
as the issue were the health of the mother. But virtually all pre-Roe laws allowed abortion
to preserve the health of the mother. In Roe, the issue is the value-laden one of terminating
a fetus before live birth, making medical data essentially irrelevant.
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of choice. Apart from the anomalous statement about physician's
consent, the Court subjected abortions in the last three months
to a full legislative veto, if that be that state's wish, unless abortion be needed to save the life of the pregnant woman.
Does the logic of the governmental neutrality-freedom of
choice principle suggested above indicate that the Court was
wrong not to treat all three trimesters alike, that is, to nullify all
legislation directed not to "health" per se, but to restricting the
freedom of choice of the pregnant woman? Or does this logic carry
us too far? Certainly, after a live birth occurs, freedom of choice
ends. Terminating the fetus-now-is-baby would be infanticide.
The Court seized on the concept of "viabilityw-that is, capacity
t o live outside the womb which theoretically begins a t the end of
the sixth month-as the dividing line between maternal choice
and state power. At the point of "viability" we do not yet have
"fetus-now-is-baby," but rather "fetus-could-now-be-baby."
At first glance this "viability" dividing line might seem to
offer the Court a basis for avoiding religious entanglements in its
abortion review process and to ground its decision on an objective
"life" concept. Under analysis, however, it collapses because it is
not an objective life concept. If the two events, live birth and
viability, were the same, then infanticide laws should apply automatically to terminating viability. Taking a somewhat different
tack, what the Court did in Roe was to empower a state to impose
a n abortion restraint in the third trimester if it so elects. Even if
imposed, says the Court, the health or life of the pregnant woman
may still override the state's interest in preserving the fetus. After
live birth, no such exception to infanticide exists. Equally significant, viability denotes only potential life, and considerable
support apparatus is needed to sustain life outside the womb for
preemies." Logically, there is as much potential life after conception and during "dependent viability" as during "independent viability." Thus, from the catch phrase used above, the
present tense could be dropped and it would be simply "fetuscould-become-baby" throughout the entire term of pregnancy.
The analogy to the conventional concept of "life" or "person"
thus fails, and the Court thereby loses a principled basis for decision by analogy to known and accepted constitutional concepts.
Moreover, although necessarily in quest of a fundamental constitutional value as a basis for overturning legislative choice, the
Court rejected the forthright, First-Amendment-based neutral
approach outlined above. Perhaps it felt that maintaining a freedom of choice concept up to live birth, although possessing logical
66
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integrity, would have been tgo extreme in outlawing all antiabortion legislation. It also rejected an alternative path that
would have had equal, logical integrity. That is, the Court could
have viewed this matter as involving such a maze of religious
values, personal liberties, and even population control policies,
that it should remain within the political process for the time
being. After all, there is-or used to be-the doctrine of reasonable doubt to stay the Court's hand. Perhaps the Court felt that
this latter course of sustaining all anti-abortion legislation was
too extreme because it would have sacrificed at least some significant personal interests with which the Court was prepared to deal
now, that is, the case of the rape victim or the impoverished and
overburdened mother of many, whose contraception has fai1ed.lg2
For whatever reason, the Court made up its own "legislative
compromise." Although from a personal standpoint some may be
inclined to favor the result because of concern for the personal
interests just mentioned,lg3the format of the decision is disturbing. It fits neither the model of restricted review under reasonably
identifiable constitutional principles, nor forthright substantive
due process review grounded on judicially articulated fundamental principles. The Court, admitting uncertainty, engaged in a
dialogue transcending the issue in the actual case, and then announced a set of rules designed not merely to decide the case
before it but to regulate the field in such detail as to minimize
future questions and litigation.lg4

IV. CONCLUSION
This discursive review of the "new" substantive due process
has suggested that a natural justice-fundamental liberties spirit
of review has been a persistent strand in American judicial review, despite the apparent confines imposed by our written Constitution and the absence in natural law theory of any concept of
an official interpreter and enforcer. The manner in which the
provisions of the Bill of Rights were "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment gave the provisions an open-ended funda192. See Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
2655 (1975).
193. The author shares this inclination.
194. We find a similar example, although on a smaller scale, in the voting residence
case where, after nullifying a 1-year period, the Court volunteered that 30 days would be
adequate to take care of all legitimate state concerns in election regulation. Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 346-49 (1972).
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mental liberties cast. Recent developments such as the strict
scrutiny doctrine under the equal protection clause, the stringency in procedural requirements, and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine may operate to upset legislation even more frequently than under the old substantive due process approach of
the Lochner v. New York era. Furthermore, these new doctrines
have a simple, formulary character leading to semi-automatic
invalidations, with even less opportunity for the balancing of interests than occurred, or could occur, under the "old" substantive
due process.
Another development, which for lack of a better term might
be called "participatory review," is the inclination of the courts
to lay down prescriptions for the future when deciding cases. This
can occur as in Roe v. Wade in the course of announcing the scope
of "fundamental doctrine." It can occur at the level of prescribing
"remedies" once constitutional violations are found, as in "section 1983 litigation" affecting the administration of state mental
hospitals and penal institutions.
The effect is to keep the courts in the forefront of American
policymaking on a wide range of vital issues, and also to put
severe strains on the conventional adversary method. Articulation of novel fundamental values and prescription of detailed
ground rules for the future require both a breadth of intake of
empirical data and a degree of openness of dialogue on premises
and values to which the judicial method is not well suited. It is
time to address ourselves to the increasing tension between the
judiciary's role in expanded review and expanded supervision,
and the judiciary's available methods for informing itself so that
it can be a direct participant in the evolution of public policy.
Perhaps that is what separation of powers is all about.

